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COURT REPORTS

permit for 700 acre-feet of water from the existing well to a new well
that Day planned to drill. The Authority approved Day's request to
drill a new well on December 10, 1999. However, on November 8,
2000, the Authority's general manager recommended that the Authority grant Day zero feet of water because Day failed to prove that the
water satisfied a "purpose authorized by law." Day objected to this recommendation, and the Authority referred Day's objection to the State
Office of Administrative Hearings where an administrative law judge
("ALJ") recommended the Authority grant Day a permit for fourteen
acre-feet of water. Day appealed this decision to the Authority's board
of directors ("Board"). On March 11, 2003, the Board adopted the
ALJ's recommendation and issued Day a permit for fourteen acre-feet
of water. Day filed suit in United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. The Authority filed a motion to dismiss the case
from federal court because Day's case involved questions of state law
and issues of vital state concern.
The Authority based its motion to dismiss on Sierra Club v. City of
San Antonio, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Burford abstention doctrine in cases involving the Authority. The
court noted the Burford abstention doctrine turned on whether the
plaintiff's claim involved an issue of state law that a state court needed
to rule on before the federal case could proceed. The court found the
state of Texas retained great interest in the regulation of the Edwards
Aquifer, and because the Aquifer contained a finite amount of water,
the state should maintain the regulatory scheme. Furthermore, the
state maintained a comprehensive administrative and appellate procedure for considering questions regarding the Edwards Aquifer and
held greater interest and familiarity with the Aquifer than did the federal government. Therefore, the court granted the Authority's motion
to dismiss the case based on the Burford abstention doctrine.
In sum, the court granted the Authority's motion to dismiss because the Edwards Aquifer, a completely intrastate source of water,
contained a limited amount of water, because the water and its regulation were of vital importance to Texas, and because Texas already
maintained a comprehensive regulatory system to manage the aquifer.
BrettJohnson
Friends of the Earth v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 346 F. Supp.
2d 182 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding the Clean Water Act was ambiguous as
to whether the United States Environmental Protection Agency must
calculate total maximum daily loads on a daily basis and upholding the
United States Environmental Protection Agency's adoption of nondaily TMDLs as reasonable statutory construction and reasonably determined to achieve daily water quality standards).
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Friends of the Earth ("Friends"), an environmental group, sued the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in United
States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming the EPA's
approval of total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for the District of
Columbia violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Both parties moved
for summary judgment. Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to
promulgate water quality standards and supplement those standards
with TMDLs if effluent controls are not achieving the water quality
standards ("WQSs"). TMDLs are maximum pollutant concentrations
in a water body, for a given time, calculated at a level necessary to implement the WQSs, with seasonal variation and a margin of safety. The
District of Columbia created a yearly TMDL for biological oxygen demand ("BOD"), and the EPA approved this standard. The EPA created and approved a seasonal TMDL for total suspended solids.
Friends claimed the EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner
for two reasons: the CWA required daily TMDLs, and both the BOD
and total suspended solids TMDL were insufficient to achieve the

WQSs.
The court first examined whether the EPA acted arbitrarily in setting a seasonal and annual TMDL, reviewing the agency decision under the standards set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc. First, the court asked whether Congress had directly addressed the issue. If the intent of Congress was clear, then the agency
and the court must give effect to that intent. Second, if the statute was
silent or ambiguous then the court must determine if the agency based
its answer upon a permissible construction of the statute.
To determine if the statute was ambiguous, the court applied traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including language, intent,
structure, and purpose. The court did not read the term "daily" in
TMDL in isolation, but rather in statutory context. The court looked
to the intent of Congress in creating the CWA and TMDLs, and compared portions of section 402 requiring the EPA to base municipal
storm sewer permits upon best management practices with the TMDL
requirement in section 303 (d). If section 303 (d) required daily TMDL
standards, it would alter the flexible choices and maximum extent
practicable controls of section 402. The court determined the conflict
between these two sections revealed an ambiguity in congressional intent on TMDLs. The court also decided that section 402 was not an
exception to 303 (d) TMDL requirements, as argued by Friends.
The structure and purpose of the CWA also suggested to the court
that Congress did not intend a rigid application of the word daily. The
EPA used TMDLs as tools, not formal controls, to achieve WQSs in
non-attainment waterbodies. The court noted Congress divided mandatory technology controls from WQSs and TMDLs within the CWA.
TMDLs exist to supplement insufficient technology based controls, and
it would be at odds with the statute to require the EPA to use daily
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TMDLs even if non-daily TMDLs more effectively achieved WQSs. In
addition, the court determined Congress did not intend for the EPA to
impose daily TMDLs when they generated no benefit, by looking to
various other sections of the CWA. The statute permits the EPA to issue permit modifications if there is a reasonable relationship between
the costs and the benefits. The EPA may modify effluent limitations
based on TMDLs where the water quality exceeds the WQSs.
The court also concluded non-daily TMDLs were consistent with
the congressional policy to delegate power to the EPA to set these
standards where appropriate. Deviation from daily standards occurred
only when there was a polluted waterbody that non-daily standards
would more effectively regulate. There was no agency usurpation in
this case, since the EPA was not substituting its judgment for that of
Congress. The regulated area required knowledge of the industry and
the definition of daily-required agency expertise. The court held the
word "daily" was ambiguous after considering the language, intent,
structure, and purpose of the CWA. Congress did not clearly intend to
require the EPA to calculate only daily TMDLs.
Since Congress was ambiguous in creating TMDLs, the court next
determined whether the EPA's use of a seasonal and annual TMDL was
reasonable in light of the record and purpose of the statute. For the
BOD TMDL, the court decided the EPA's use of a yearly term was reasonable because the agency explained its decision, and no evidence
existed of a superior term. The court also determined the seasonal
total suspended solids TMDL was reasonable since the EPA explained
its decision, and the court reasoned seasonal reductions effectively
regulated total suspended solids.
The second issue for the court was whether the EPA calculated the
TMDLs at a level reasonably stringent enough to achieve the District of
Columbia's daily WQSs. The court noted it must uphold a TMDL if it
falls within a zone of reasonableness.
The court concluded the EPA reasonably calculated the yearly
BOD standard to achieve the District of Columbia's daily WQSs because of the scientific uncertainty involved and the EPA's use of reliable computer modeling. The court would not require the EPA to
explain how the TMDLs would achieve the daily WQSs, only why the
EPA believed they would achieve the WQSs. Although the court believed one of the EPA's possible regulation scenarios was a better
choice, the court still upheld the EPA's decision because it was reasonable. The court also upheld the EPA's approach for determining the
margin of safety because determining the proper approach for margin
of safety was a policy choice left specifically to the agency's judgment.
The court also upheld the seasonal TMDL for total suspended solids against a challenge of failure to achieve daily WQSs. The EPA
chose to calculate the total suspended solids TMDL to achieve wildlife
protection and not recreational and aesthetic uses. The court permit-

WATER 1A W REVIEW

Volume 8

ted the EPA to use wildlife protection as a surrogate standard for
achieving recreational and aesthetic uses of the river because Congress
did not state a specific process for TMDL calculation. The EPA reasonably assumed their level of reduction would meet all standards. In
addition, the WQSs for the District of Columbia were subjective, requiring only that the waters be free from "objectionable odor, color,
taste, or turbidity." The court would not accept objective facts to contradict the EPA's assertion because there was no frame of reference to
compare the evidence. The EPA also indicated their willingness to
revise the standard set for total suspended solids if there was a future
showing the seasonal average violated the subjective criteria.
The court finally addressed the EPA's assignment of wasteload allocation, or the allocation of the receiving water's capacity to existing or
future sources of pollution. The EPA assigned waste loads by a single
permit to a treatment plant and a single permit to the District of Columbia's municipal separate storm sewer system. The court found this
allocation was a reasonable interpretation because allocation into categories of sources did not deviate from the CWA or regulations.
For the reasons articulated above, the court granted summary
judgment for the EPA.
HeatherHeinlein
Grand Lake Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Veneman, 340 F. Supp. 2d
1162 (D. Colo. 2004) (holding the United States Forest Service could
require special use permits that affected the use of private land adjacent to the boundaries of a national forest, but the Forest Service did
not have the authority to impound private property to compel holders
of special use permits to comply with the terms contained therein).
Grand Lake Estates Homeowners Association ("GLEHA") filed suit
in United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the
Secretary of Agriculture asserting claims for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"), relating to GLEHA's use of facilities on Shadow Mountain Reservoir. GLEHA owned a marina and docks built in the early 1960s on a
small body of water located within the Grand Lake Estates subdivision,
where a small man-made channel provided boat access from the marina to Shadow Mountain Reservoir. In 1978 Congress created the
Arapahoe National Recreation Area ("ANRA"), which encompassed
Shadow Mountain Reservoir, and delegated management of the ANRA
to the Forest Service.
In 1985 the Forest Service notified GLEHA that it required a special use permit for GLEHA's marina. Thereafter, GLEHA applied for,
and the Forest Service approved, special use permits for GLEHA's marina and boat docks. Pursuant to the special use permits, the Forest
Service assessed GLEHA an annual fee, which GLEHA refused to pay

